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Abstract
Poker has become a popular pastime all over the world. At any
given moment one can find tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of play-
ers playing poker via their computers on the major on-line gaming
sites. Indeed, according to the Vancouver, B.C. based pokerpulse.com
estimates, more than 190 million US dollars daily is bet in on-line
poker rooms. But communication and computation are changing as
the relentless application of Moore’s Law brings computation and in-
formation into the quantum realm. The quantum theory of games
concerns the behavior of classical games when played in the coming
quantum computing environment or when played with quantum infor-
mation. In almost all cases, the ”quantized” versions of these games
afford many new strategic options to the players.
The study of so-called quantum games is quite new, arising from a
seminal paper of D. Meyer [10] published in Physics Review Letters in
1999. The ensuing near decade has seen an explosion of contributions
and controversy over what exactly a quantized game really is and if
there is indeed anything new for game theory. With the settling of some
of these controversies [3], it is now possible to fully analyze some of the
basic endgame models from the game theory of Poker and predict with
confidence just how the optimal play of Poker will change when played
in the coming quantum computation environment. The analysis here
shows that for certain players, ”entangled” poker will allow results that
outperform those available to players ”in real life”.
1 Overview
When playing on line, players indicate their strategic choices, i.e. their
choice of action at each of their opportunities to act, by communicating this
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choice of action to a central server that acts as a referee. At the conclusion
of each hand this server determines the outcome of the hand and makes
the appropriate payoffs. Of fundamental importance here will be how the
players communicate their strategic choices to the central server.
For simplicity, the models of a poker endgame we consider will allow
each player a choice of exactly two strategic options. These options will be
represented as a state of a ”bit”, either classical or quantum as appropriate to
our discussion. The communication of strategies will be modeled as follows.
The referee prepares the players’ bits in a particular initial state and sends
them to the players. The players then indicate their strategic choice by
acting on the bit, the two pure strategies represented by the two actions on
the bits of either ”not flipping” the bit or of ”flipping” it. Then the players
return their bits to the referee. The referee then examines the bits, from
these observations determines each player’s strategic choice, and from these
computes the outcome of the game and the appropriate payoffs. As we shall
shortly see, whether this communication occurs over classical or quantum
channels will have a significant effect on the number and type of players’
strategies and on the determination of the Nash equilibrium strategies (also
known as ”solutions” or ”optimal strategies”) for our models.
The endgame models considered here are known respectively as ”Sim-
plified Poker” and the ”Nash-Shapley Poker Model”. Simplified Poker is
a discretized version of the poker models of Borel [4] and Von Neuman
[13], and is a two-player game that illustrates the advantage of ”mixing”
one’s strategic choices to achieve a maximal return via an ”optimal bluff-
ing frequency”. The Nash-Shapley poker model [11] is a three-player game
that as well as further illustrating the advantage to ”mixing” one’s strate-
gic choices, illustrates two other important points. First, the Nash Shapley
model illustrates advantage of what the poker literature terms ”position”.
In particular, the last player to act can exploit the informational advantage
of acting last by bluffing at the appropriate frequency. Second, and more
importantly, the Nash-Shapley model also illustrates the importance of de-
fending against the bluff, which represents strength when one is in fact weak,
via slow-playing, which represents weakness when one is in fact strong, via
an ”optimal slow-playing frequency”. The Nash-Shapley model also has the
interesting feature in its optimal bluffing and slow-playing frequencies are
irrational, and hence can only be approximated and never actually realized
in real life play.
Our endgame models can be thought of as abstracting the following
situation from Texas Hold’em. After the last community card has been
dealt, the common cards form a king high straight with no possible flush.
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Because of these cards the players cards are now one of exactly two types,
either ”High” (an ace, which makes an ace high straight the best possible
hand given the community cards) or ”Low” (everything else, leaving the
player with the king high straight on the board). We further assume that
from long experience playing against each other the players know that the
probability that a given opponent holds an ace is exactly 12 . We’ll consider
the betting up to this point as an ante a, and that each player has the ability
to make a single bet of size b.
This situation is abstracted as follows. Each player antes an amount a
into a ”pot” and is dealt a single card from an infinite deck containing two
types of cards, H and L. For each player the probability of receiving an H
is exactly 12 , as is the probability of receiving an L. In a showdown, H beats
L and the winning hand receiving the pot, and if multiple players hold equal
winning hands, the pot is divided equally between them.
2 Some Classical Game Theory
Here it’s best to begin with a definition.
Definition 2.1. Given a set {1, 2, · · · , n} of players, for each player a set
Si (i = 1, · · · , n) of so-called pure strategies, and a set Ωi (i = 1, · · · , n) of
possible outcomes, a game G is a vector-valued function whose domain is
the Cartesian product of the Si’s and whose range is the Cartesian product
of the Ωi’s. In symbols
n∏
i=1
Si
G−→
n∏
i=1
Ωi
The function G is sometimes referred to as the payoff function.
Here a play of the game is a choice by each player of a particular strategy
si the collection of which forms a strategy profile (s1, · · · , sn) whose corre-
sponding outcome profile is G(s1, · · · , sn) = (ω1, · · · , ωn), where the ωi’s
represent each player’s individual outcome. Note that by assigning a real
valued utility to each player which quantifies that player’s preferences over
the various outcomes, we can without loss of generality, assume that the
Ωi’s are all copies of R, the field of real numbers.
In game theory one is frequently concerned with the identification of
special strategies or strategic profiles. For example, most players would love
to identify a strategy that guarantees a maximal utility. As this is not usually
possible, a security strategy, that is, a strategic choice that guarantees an
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explicit lower bound to the utility received, is also sought. But for a fixed
(n−1)-tuple of opponents’ strategies, rational players seek a best reply, that
is a strategy s?i ∈ Si that delivers a utility at least as great, if not greater,
than any other strategy si ∈ Si. That is
G(?, · · · , ?, s?i , ?, · · · , ?) ≥ G(?, · · · , ?, si, ?, · · · , ?) ∀si ∈ Si
A Nash equilibrium (NE) for G is a strategy profile (s1, s2, ..., sn) such
that each si is a best reply to the (n−1)-tuple of opponents’ strategies. Other
ways of expressing this concept include the observation that no player can
increase his or her payoffs by unilaterally deviating from his or her equi-
librium strategy, or that at equilibrium a player’s opponents are indifferent
to that player’s strategic choice. As an example, consider the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, a two player game where each player has exactly two strategies (a
so-called bimatrix game) whose payoff function is indicated by the tableau
below
t1 t2
s1 (3, 3) (0, 5)
s2 (5, 0) (1, 1)
Table 1: Prisoner’s Dilemma
Here, note that for player 1 the pure strategy s2 always delivers a higher
outcome than the strategy s1 (say s2 strongly dominates s1) and for player
2 the strategy t2 strongly dominates t1. Hence the pair (s2, t2) is a (unique)
Nash Equilibrium.
However, games need not have equilibria amongst the pure strategy pro-
files as is exemplified by the final forms of both our poker games under
consideration. We refer to the final forms of these games because in the
beginning the strategy spaces for both games are quite large, but can be
simplified by making certain rationality assumptions about the players. A
common such assumption is that rational players will never play a given
strategy when there is another available strategy that dominates it, that
is the dominating delivers a payoff as good or better (and in at least one
case strictly better) than that of the dominated strategy for every profile
of opponents’ strategic choices. When this fact is known to both players,
dominated strategies can be safely eliminated from the players’ strategic
sets with no loss of information. Thus the game theoretic analysis of many
games begins with the sequential elimination of dominated strategies. Note
for our example of the Prisoner’s Dilemma above, this process identifies the
Nash Equilibrium (s2, t2) almost immediately.
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3 Application to our Poker Models
This process is utilized in the classical analysis of Simplified Poker, where
for computational convenience we set the antes at 15 and the bets at 10; and
in the analysis of the Nash-Shapley model where again for computational
convenience we set the antes at 16 and the bets at 64. In both Simplified
Poker and the Nash-Shapley poker model the elimination process terminates
when each player has but two strategies left to choose from.
What do these strategies look like ? They are in fact functions, with
domain the set of hands (in our case just individual cards) the players could
possibly be dealt and range an n-tuple of players actions, a coordinate for
each opportunity in the game where a player can act and an assignment to
each of these opportunities of the specific action the player takes.
In Simplified Poker each player has at most one opportunity to act.
The possible actions for player 1 are to either pass, moving the game to a
showdown, or to bet. If player 1 bets, then the actions available to player 2
are to either pass, thereby awarding the pot to player 1 or to call, that is,
also placing a bet in the pot and moving the game to a showdown. Of course
the hand (in this case the card) a player is dealt can affect a player’s choice
of action. Thus a pure strategy for player 1 is a function with domain H, L
and range Pass, Bet. There are four such functions and the two that survive
the process of eliminating of dominated strategies are playing directly, that
is passing when holding an L and betting when holding an H (denoted in
the tables as s1), and running a possible bluff, i.e. betting holding an L or
an H (denoted in the tables as s2). For player 2, initially there are also four
pure strategies and after eliminating dominated strategies, her surviving
strategies are either playing directly, that is, passing when holding an L and
calling when holding an H (denoted in the tables as t1) or calling a possible
bluff, that is calling when holding either an L or an H (denoted in the tables
as t2). The bimatrix game arising from this particular form of Simplified
Poker has payoff function given by
t1 t2
s1 (0, 0) (5/2,−5/2)
s2 ((5/4,−5/4) (0, 0)
Table 2: Simplified Poker
Turning to the Nash-Shapley poker model there are now three players,
and as before at every opportunity to act each player has the choice of
exactly two actions, either to Pass or to Bet and as each player executes
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their choice of action as the play of the game proceeds, an action sequence
of the play is defined. As usual, a Pass after a Bet earlier in the action
sequence constitutes folding and hence the loss of any claim to any part of
the pot, and a Bet following an earlier one in the action sequence constitutes
a call. But in this model a Pass by an early position player when no Bet
has been made in the action sequence up to that point does not necessarily
mean that that player cannot later call a bet by subsequent player. Indeed,
if player 1 elects to Pass at his first opportunity and player 2 or 3 (or both)
subsequently bets, the action will return to player 1 who will then be faced
with the choice of either Passing (i.e. folding) or Betting (i.e. calling) and
similarly for player 2. If in the sequence of action only a single player has
Bet and the others Pass, then that player is awarded the pot; and if multiple
players have bet, a showdown determines the winner or winners as described
above for Simplified Poker. But slightly different from that game, the action
sequence in the Nash-Shapley model consisting of a Pass by all three players
does not force a showdown, rather each player has their ante returned, and
thus receives a payoff of 0.
In the Nash-Shapley model then we find there are 13 possible action
sequences BBB, BBP , BPB, BPP , PBBB, PBBP , PBPB, PBPP ,
PPBBB, PPBBP , PPBPB, PPBPP , PPP . Moreover, each player has
exactly four possible opportunities to act, depending on the action sequence
up to that point in the game, and so a pure strategy for each player must
give a 4-tuple of actions for each possible card dealt. There are 16 such 4-
tuples, and hence each player has 162 = 256 pure strategies to choose from.
As before we assume that our players are rational in the sense that they
care only about money, more is better than less, and that all dollars are of
equal utility to them. Then we proceed to eliminate dominated strategies
just as before, for example, note that any strategy that calls for a player to
fold when holding H is strongly dominated. This process terminates with
each player having exactly two strategies remaining, one calling for direct
play, the other calling for deceptive play in the correct circumstance. These
strategies are indicated in tables 3, 4, and 5 below where we consider the
strategy spaces for players 1, 2, and 3 as S = {s1, s2} , T = {t1, t2} and
U = {u1, u2} respectively.
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−− PBB PBP PPB
H B B B B
L P P P P
s1 Play directly
−− PBB PBP PPB
H P B B B
L P P P P
s2 Slow play a winner
Table 3: Player 1.
B P PPBB PPBP
H B B B B
L P P P P
t1 Play directly
B P PPBB PPBP
H B P B B
L P P P P
t2 Slow play a winner
Table 4: Player 2.
Analyzing the results for each of the eight possible deals and eight pure
strategy profiles we get the table of expected payoffs to our players which
appears in table 6.
In table 6 the sub-table on the left is the payoff function when player 3
plays u1, while the sub-table on the right is the payoff function when player
3 employs u2.
4 Classical Randomization and Game Extension
Note now that neither Simplified Poker nor the Nash-Shapley Poker model
has a Nash equilibrium among the pure strategy profiles. Classical game
theoretic formalism now calls upon the theorist to extend the game G by
enlarging the domain to the set of so-called mixed strategies and then ex-
tending the payoff functions to this larger domain. Of course, the question
of if and how a given function extends is a time-honored problem in math-
ematics. A careful application of the mathematics of extension suggests a
formalism for extending these (and other) games via quantization. These
”quantized” games will exhibit drastic changes in game behavior as com-
pared to the classical situation. Thus we examine this extension process in
some detail.
Consider then, for each player, the set of mixed strategies, that is, the
set of probability distributions over each player’s pure strategy set Si. For
a given set X, denote the probability distributions over X by ∆(X) and
note that when X is finite, with k elements say, the set ∆(X) is just the
k − 1 dimensional simplex ∆(k − 1) over X, i.e., the set of real convex
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BB BP PB PP
H B B B B
L P P P P
u1 Play directly
BB BP PB PP
H B B B B
L P P P B
u2 Run a possible bluff
Table 5: Player 3.
t1 t2
s1 (0, 0, 0) (2,−4, 2)
s2 (−4, 2, 2) (−3,−3, 6)
u1
t1 t2
s1 (−2,−2, 4) (−2, 6,−4)
s2 (6,−2,−4) (10, 10,−20)
u2
Table 6: The Nash-Shapely payoff function.
linear combinations of elements of X. Of course, we can embed X into
∆(X) by considering the element x as mapped to the probability distribution
which assigns 1 to x and 0 to everything else. Thus in the finite case,
the pure strategies embed into the mixed strategies as the ”corners” of the
appropriate simplex. For a given game G, denote this embedding of Si into
∆(Si) by ei.
Now our game G is classically extended to a new, larger game Gmix, as
follows. Given a profile (p1, . . . , pn) of probability distributions over the Si’s,
by taking the product distribution we obtain a probability distribution over
the product
∏
Si. Taking the push out by G of this probability distribution
we obtain a probability distribution over the image of G. By following this
by the expectation operator, we obtain the expected outcome of the mixed
strategy profile (p1, . . . , pn). Assigning the expected outcome to each mixed
strategy profile we obtain the extended game
Gmix :
∏
∆(Si)→
∏
Ωi
Note Gmix is a true extension of G as Gmix ◦ Πei = G; that is, we have
the commutative diagram that appears in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Extension of G by Gmix
Nash’s famous theorem [2] says that if Si are all finite, then there always
exists an equilibrium in Gmix. Unfortunately, this equilibrium refered to
in Nash’s Theorem is called a mixed strategy equilibrium for G, when it is
not an equilibrium of G at all, the abusive terminology confusing G with its
image, ImG. Indeed, this abusive terminology is where much confusion in
quantum (and classical) game theory begins.
For Simplified Poker above the equilibrium strategies are where player
I chooses his first strategy 13 of the time and player II chooses her second
strategy 13 of the time. In equilibrium player one can expect a payout of
5/6, the exact amount player 2 can expect to lose.
What this says about poker is that it is better to ”mix up your game”
than to blindly follow a predetermined strategy. Further, this little model
shows that a large share of your expected gain from bluffing does not come
from the pots you steal, but rather from the ”mistaken” calls made by your
opponent when she believes you may be bluffing when in fact you are not.
The Nash-Shapley Poker model shows more. At equilibrium players
1 and 2 play deceptively (i.e their second pure strategy) with probability
p = −1 +√7/5, approximately 18.3% of the time, and player three runs a
possible bluff with probability 4p+85p+12 , approximately 68% of the time. Also
in equilibrium, player 3 expects to win about 80 cents and players 1 and 2
each expect to lose about 40 cents each.
This says a great deal about three handed poker. As in Simplified Poker,
it is better to ”mix up your game” in the Nash-Shapley model than to
blindly follow a predetermined pure strategy. Player 3 is seen to have a
definite advantage in this particular poker model due to the virtue of his
position, that is, the fact that he gets to act last. Player 3 exploits this
advantage by occasionally bluffing when his opponents have both displayed
weakness by Passing, specifically by betting when holding L and faced with
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the betting sequence PP . The poker lingo refers to this as stealing the pot
and in equilibrium player 3 is attempting this about 23 of the time.
But players 1 and 2 are not completely helpless. They know that player
3 is frequently attempting to steal the pot and so each occasionally sets a
trap for player 3 by slowplaying their winner, specifically, by passing when
holding H in the hopes that player 3 is holding L and will attempt a steal.
The poker lingo refers to this as snapping off player 3’s bluff and an early
action player’s slowplaying strategy as sandbagging. Note that attempting
to snap off bluffs is not without risk, as player 3 may well pass out the
hand when holding L and deny to players 1 or 2 their sure gain of at least
half of players 3’s ante in the situation where at least one of players 1 and
2 bet holding H and player 3 holds L. On the other hand, the rewards
of successfully snapping off a bluff are great as if player 3 holding L does
attempt a steal in response to a slowplay by one of players 1 or 2, he loses
the maximum possible of an ante plus a bet to that player.
One can ask, just how often does this happen ? An easy application
of Bayes’ Rule [2] shows that in equilibrium the probability of at least one
of players 1 and 2 is using his or her slowplaying strategy is about 28%,
so player 3 can expect to have his bluffs snapped off a little more than a
quarter of the time.
5 Classical Communication and Correlated Equi-
libria
Before proceeding onto quantization, it is useful to place other classical game
theoretical ideas such as classical mediated communication and Aumann’s
notion of a correlated equilibrium into this context. One begins by observing
that the function from
∏n
i=1 ∆(Si)→ ∆(ImG) is not necessarily onto. As an
example consider any 2× 2 game G. If player 1 plays his first pure strategy
with probability p, say, and player 2 plays her second pure strategy with
probability q, say, the resulting probability distribution over the outcomes
of G is given by the tableau below:
t1 t2
s1 p(1− q) pq
s2 (1− p)(1− q) (1− p)q
An easy exercise now shows that the element of ∆(ImG) represented by
10
t1 t2
s1 1/2 0
s2 0 1/2
is not realizable by any choice of p and q. One way that classical mediated
communication can affect the play of games arises from this issue. Suppose
players desire to have a particular probability distribution ρ ∈ ∆(ImG)
apply to the outcomes of their play of the game G and that during pre-play
negotiation the players are able to hire a referee for negligible cost. For
a given ρ ∈ ∆(ImG) the referee is meant to enforce ρ over the outcomes
of the game as follows. The referee secretly observes a random event with
probability distribution ρ, thus determining a specific outcome of G. The
referee then communicates to each player only his or her strategic choice
that yields the observed outcome.
Note that the players are no longer playing the game G, but in fact a
much larger game Gcomρ which is easily described for 2× 2 games and whose
generalization to games with larger strategic spaces should be clear from our
description. Suppose the strategic space for each player is represented by
the pair S = {A,B}. The strategic spaces for Gcomρ can be represented by
the quadruple T = {A′, B′, C ′, D′} where the strategy C ′ represents a player
always cooperating with the referee, D′ represents the strategy where the
player always deviates from the referee’s instruction (i.e. playing B when
he hears A and vice-versa), A′ represents cooperating with the referee when
A is recommended and deviating otherwise, and B′ represents cooperating
with the referee when B is recommended and deviating otherwise.
Two other things to note here are, first, if both players choose to play
C ′, then the outcome of the new game is exactly the expected outcome of
the game G under ρ. Second, Gcomρ extends the original game G as there
are embeddings fi : {A,B} → {A′, B′, C ′, D′} taking A to A′ and B to B′
such that G = Gcomρ ◦
∏2
i=1 fi, as in the diagram in Figure 2.
Hence, classical mediated communication gives a family, indexed by
∆(ImG), of extensions of G. Following Aumann [2], a correlated equilib-
rium for G occurs whenever (C ′, C ′) is a Nash equilibrium in Gcomρ . That
is, the players’ agreement to follow the referee is self policing, meaning that
there is no gain to a player from unilateral deviating from the referee’s rec-
ommendations. Note again the abusive terminology, the strategic choice for
a correlated equilibrium is not a strategic choice for G at all, but rather a
strategic choice outside the embedded strategies for G in a larger game. Of
11
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Figure 2: Extension of G by Gcomρ
course, the use of correlated equilibrium may or may not improve the lot
of the players. A classic example of correlated equilibrium improving the
players’ lot is given by the variant of the 2× 2 game of Chicken given below
t1 t2
s1 (2, 2) (0, 3)
s2 (3, 0) (−1,−1)
Table 7: Chicken
An easy exercise shows that (s2, t1) and (s1, t2) are both pure strategy
equilibria and there is a unique mixed strategy equilibrium where every
player plays each of his or her pure strategies with equal probability. This
mixed strategy equilibrium pays out 1 to each player. It is also easy to
see that even without a referee any real convex linear combination of these
three outcomes forms a self-policing agreement between the players. For
example, the players could jointly observe a fair coin and agree to play the
(s1, t2) if it falls Heads and (s2, t1) if it falls Tails. Note that the expected
outcome of this agreement is
(
3
2 ,
3
2
)
which is better than the outcome (1, 1)
from the mixed strategy equilibrium. But even better and outside this
region is the correlated equilibrium arising from the probability distribution
1
3(2, 2) +
1
3(0, 3) +
1
3(3, 0) yielding the outcome (
5
3 ,
5
3).
An example where mediated communication does not improve the lot of
the players is given by Prisoner’s Dilemma. One easily checks that due to the
strong domination present in each player’s strategy set, players always have
an incentive to deviate from the referee’s instruction if ρ assigns a non-zero
probability to any outcome other than the Nash equilibrium (s2, t2). This
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domination is so strong that not even mixed strategy equilibrium that assign
non-zero probability to an outcome other than the Nash equilibrium (s2, t2)
exist. A similar phenomenon occurs in the zero-sum game of Simplified
Poker where any deviations from the equilibrium strategies where player I
chooses his first strategy 13 of the time and player II chooses her second
strategy 13 of the time is fully exploitable by the other player and hence an
incentive to deviate from any other potential correlated equilibrium strategy.
The same holds for the Nash-Shapley Poker model.
6 Quantum Randomization and Game Extension
We now wish to pass to a more general notion of randomization, that of
quantum superposition and incorporate this notion into our understanding
of information, communication, and games.
Begin then with a Hilbert space H, that is, a complex vector space
equipped with an inner product. For the purpose here assume that H is
finite dimensional, and that we have a finite set X which is in one-to-one
correspondence with an orthogonal basis B of H.
By a quantum superposition of X (with respect to the basis B) we mean
a complex projective linear combination of elements of X; that is, a repre-
sentative of an equivalence class of complex linear combinations where the
equivalence between combinations is given by non-zero scalar multiplication.
Quantum mechanics call this scalar a phase. When the context is clear as to
the basis to which the set X is identified, denote the set of quantum super-
positions for X as QS(X). Of course, it is also possible to define quantum
superpositions for infinite sets, but for the purpose here, one need not be so
general. With care, what follows can be directly generalized to the infinite
case. By the coordinatization axiom of quantum mechanics, the set QS(X)
corresponds to the states of a quantum system with observational basis B.
As the underlying space of complex linear combinations is a Hilbert
space, we can assign a length to each complex linear combination and, up
to phase, always represent a projective linear combination by a complex
linear combination of length 1. This process is called normalization and is
frequently useful.
By the measurement axiom of quantum mechanics, for each quantum su-
perposition ofX we can obtain a probability distribution overX by assigning
to each component the ratio of the square of the length of its coefficient to
the square of the length of the combination. For example, the probability
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distribution produced from αx+ βy is just
|α|2
|α|2 + |β|2x+
|β|2
|α|2 + |β|2 y
Call this function QS(X)→ ∆(X) a quantum measurement with respect to
X, and note that geometrically quantum measurement is defined by pro-
jecting a normalized quantum superposition onto the various elements of
the normalized basis B. Denote this function by qmeasX , or if the set X and
basis B are clear from the context, by qmeas.
Now given a finite n-player game G, we can generalize the notion of
a mixed strategy to that of a quantum strategy. Suppose we have a col-
lection Q1, . . . , Qn of non-empty sets and a protocol, that is, a function Q
:
∏
Qi → QS(ImG). Quantum measurement qmeasImG then gives a probability
distribution over ImG. Just as in the mixed strategy case we can then form
a new game GQ by applying the expectation operator. Call the game GQ
thus defined to be the quantization of G by the protocol Q. Call the Qi’s
sets of pure quantum strategies for GQ. Moreover, if there exist embeddings
e′i : Si → Qi such that GQ ◦
∏
e′i = G, call G
Q a proper quantization of G.
If there exist embeddings e′′i : ∆(Si) → Qi such that GQ ◦
∏
e′′i = G
mix,
call GQ a complete quantization of G. These definitions are summed up in
the commutative diagram in Figure 3. Note that for proper quantizations
the original game is obtained by restricting the quantization to the image
of
∏
e′i. For general extensions, the game theory literature refers to this as
recovering the game G.
Note that the definitions of Gmix and GQ show that a complete quan-
tization is proper. Furthermore, note that finding a proper quantization
of a game G is now just a mathematically typical problem of extending a
function. It is also worth noting here that nothing prohibits us from having
a quantized game GQ play the role of G in the classical situation and by
considering the probability distributions over the Qi, creating a yet larger
game GmQ, the mixed quantization of G with respect to the protocol Q. For
a proper quantization of G, GmQ is an even larger extension of G. The game
GmQ is described in the commutative diagram of Figure 4.
Note that the quantum strategy sets Qi need not consist of quantum
superpositions, although in many quantization protocols they do, see for
example [7, 9]. Indeed, protocols with classical inputs yielding quantum
superpositions of the outcomes of certain games have already been posited
[5, 8, 12]. These and some other specific protocols are discussed in the
context of the formalism of quantized analogues of classical mixed strategies
14
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Figure 3: A Quantization Formalism
given above and also in the context of a formalism for quantized analogues
of classical behavioral strategies in [3].
Many protocols depend on an initial state of the quantum system in
question. When this system consists of more than a single quantum object,
the individual objects may possess joint states that correlate the individual
quantum states of the various objects. This phenomenon is called entangle-
ment and is underlying phenomenon providing the power to many quantum
algorithms [6] and the improvements in payoffs for players of quantum games
[3].
7 Accessing Quantum Strategies-Quantum Medi-
ated Communication and the EWL Protocol
As discussed above, in classical mediated communication, players have a ref-
eree mediate their game and the communication of their strategic choices.
When our players have but two classical pure strategies to choose from, the
communication of each players strategic choices is implemented by the send-
ing of bits to the players, put into an initial state by the referee. Presumably
players then send back their individual bits in the other state (Flipped) or
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Figure 4: Extension of G by GmQ
in the original state (Un-Flipped) to indicate the choice of their second or
first classical pure strategy respectively. The returned bits are examined by
the referee, who then makes the appropriate payoffs.
When the communication between the referee and the players is over
quantum channels, Eisert, Wilkens and Lewenstein [7] have proposed fam-
ilies of quantization protocols to give players access not just to mere prob-
abilistic mixtures of their strategic choices, but also access to quantum su-
perpositions and even probabilistic mixtures of quantum superpositions of
their original strategic choices. When there are two strategic choices for each
player in the basic game, players and the referee communicate over quantum
channels via qubits, a two pure state quantum system with a fixed observa-
tional basis. This observational basis is given in the so-called Dirac notation
by |0〉 and |1〉. This basis also induces an observational basis of the space
of the joint states of the player’s qubits, denoted for the two player case in
the Dirac notation by |0〉 ⊗ |0〉 = |00〉, |0〉 ⊗ |1〉 = |01〉, |1〉 ⊗ |0〉 = |10〉, and
|1〉 ⊗ |1〉 = |11〉. Similarly in the three player case, we have the induced ob-
servational basis for the three way joint states written in the Dirac notation
as |000〉, |001〉, |010〉, |011〉, |100〉, |101〉, |110〉, |111〉.
Each EWL protocol depends on an initial joint state of the players’ qubits
prepared by the referee. General actions on a qubit are represented by the
elements of the special unitary group SU(2) and for our game, the strategic
choice represented in classical mediated communication by No Flip is now
represented by the identity transformation in SU(2), the strategic choice
represented in classical mediated communication by Flip is now represented
by an element of Lie group SU(2) which interchanges the pure states of the
original observational basis but also maps the initial joint state prepared by
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the referee under the various profiles of actions of No Flip and Flip to a set
of mutually orthogonal joint states. This set of mutually orthogonal joint
states forms an alternative observational basis of the joint state space that
the referee will use to determine the outcomes, and hence the payoffs for
each play of the game. In the two player case these basis elements of the
joint state space are written in the Dirac notation by |NN〉, |NF 〉, |FN〉,
and |FF 〉, and in the three player case by |NNN〉, |NNF 〉, |NFN〉, |NFF 〉,
|FNN〉, |FNF 〉, |FFN〉, and |FFF 〉.
However, upon receipt of their individual qubits, players may choose not
just from the matrices representing No Flip and Flip but rather from any
element of the Lie group SU(2) as one of their pure quantum strategies
(i.e. the Qi’s in the formalism above) or even probabilistic combinations
thereof (i.e. the ∆Qi’s in the formalism) as their strategic choice and act on
their repective qubit accordingly before returning their qubit to the referee.
Note that in practice the elements of SU(2) here represent quantum su-
perpositions of the player’s original two strategies, and the mixed quantum
strategies are regular probalistic combinations of these superpositions. Note
that the players have a vastly broader strategic selection in GQ and GmQ,
even when compared to the already enlarged mixed strategy game Gmix.
The payoffs to each player of each quantum or mixed quantum strategy
profile are computed by the referee by observing the final joint state of
the player’s qubits with respect to the alternative observational basis of the
joint state space described above and the referee then makes the appropriate
payoffs. Per our formalism above, this procedure describes for each initial
state I, a protocol QI and a quantized and mixed quantized game GQI and
GmQI .
For two players, if the initial joint state prepared by the referee is given
in the Dirac notation by |00〉, then the corresponding EWL protocol is not
only a complete quantization but is in fact equivalent to the classical game
Gmix. This is also true in the three player case with initial joint state
|000〉. But when the initial state is given by the maximally entangled state
I = |00〉 + |11〉 in the two player case and in the case of three players by
I = |000〉+ |111〉, the corresponding EWL protocol still induces a complete
quantization of the original game, but is not equivalent to the game Gmix,
and in contrast to the mixed strategy situation, the corresponding protocols
set up onto maps from the appropriate product of the strategy spaces to
∆ (ImG).
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8 Payoff Calculation and Model Applications
The next issue to address is the actual computation of the specific proba-
bility distribution over Im(G) that arises from a specific profile of players’
choices of elements of SU(2) or, even worse, a profile of players’ choices of
probability distributions over SU(2). For this task it is useful to employ the
quaternions, which are a non-commutative, four dimensional, normed real
division algebra with canonical basis consisting of the real number 1 and
units i, j, and k. These fundamental units satisfy the so-called Hamiliton
relation i2 = j2 = k2 = ijk = −1. This means that each quaternion q
can be expressed as a real linear combination q = a+ bi+ cj + dk and two
such are added or multiplied polynomially, subject to Hamilton’s relation
above. Each quaternion q as above possesses a quaternionic conjugate q∗
with q∗ = a − bi − cj − dk. The real valued multiplicative norm (or length
on the quaternions is defined by the formula |q|2 = q∗q = a2 + b2 + c2 + d2
and all non-zero quaternions q posess a non-zero inverse q−1 = q
∗
|q| . The unit
quaternions are those with length 1.
For two player games, by appropriately identifying each players’ pure
quantum strategies with unit quaternions, S. Landsburg [9] showed in 2005
that the probability distribution over the outcomes of G arising from the
profile (p, q) of quantum strategies in the game GQI can be computed di-
rectly from the unit quaternion pq by merely squaring the real length of
each of its canonical components. This description additionally provided
the computational capability to compute the expected payoffs in the game
GmQI by integrating over the 3-sphere the expression pq with respect to the
probability distributions over the unit quaternions that form a strategy pro-
file in GmQI . This computational capability allowed Lansburg to completely
determine the potential Nash equilibria of the games GQI and GmQI , that is,
the game G played under the maximally entangled EWL protocol described
above. In particular, for zero sum games like Simplified Poker, Landsburg
shows that there are no Nash equilibria among the pure quantum strategies,
(i.e. in GQI ) and a unique Nash equilibrium in GmQI in which each player
uses the uniform probability distribution (or a discrete equivalent) over his
or her choice of pure quantum strategies. The resulting probability distribu-
tion over the payoffs of G is now again the uniform distribution, assigning
an equal probability to each of the four outcomes of G and returning as
payoffs to the players the average of the original four payoffs of the Game
G. It is also worth noting that the equilibrium strategies given by the uni-
form distribution over the pure quantum strategies are more than just best
replies to each other, they are in fact security strategies against which each
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player’s opponent has no recourse.
It is here that a fundamental question arises; that is, is this or any
other Nash equilibria in such a quantized game truly new? That is, is the
probability distribution that arises from an equilibrium pair in the quantized
version of game G different from that arising from a classical correlated
equilibrium for G? Note that for the Prisoner’s Dilemma, this distribution
does not arise from a classical correlated equilibrium as it assigns a non-zero
probability to each of the classical non-equilibrium payoffs, and so does not
correspond to any classical correlated equilium for this game, yet delivering
a payoff (2.5) to the players, that is clearly superior to the payoff (1) of the
classical pure strategy equilibrium.
An even more remarkable result holds true for the maximally entangled
EWL quantization of the zero-sum game of Simplified Poker, where the
payout to player 1 of 1516 for the uniformly mixed quantum strategy is superior
to the classical mixed strategy equilibrium payoff of 56 for player 1, yet is still
a security strategy for player 1 against which player 2 has no recourse. In
particular, this shows that Player 1 can actually do better playing entangled
poker over the quantum internet than playing standard poker in either the
current on-line environment or in ”real life”. Player 1’s advantage over
player 2 in this game has actually been enhanced by quantization.
Similar, yet more dramatic changes occur in the Nash-Shapley poker
model when it is played under the maximally entangled EWL protocol
described above. This follows from an extension of Landsburg’s ideas by
Ahmed, Bleiler, and Khan [1] who, as Landsburg, identify the players’ in-
dividual quantum strategies with copies of the unit quanternions, but then
further embed these quaternionic spaces within the unit octonions. The oc-
tonions are a non-associative, non-commutative, eight dimensional, normed
real division algebra with canonical basis consisting of the real number 1
and units i1, i2, i3, i4, i5, i6, i7. The elements of the octonions are expressed
in the form
a0 +
7∑
j=1
ajij (1)
where a0 and the aj are elements of the real numbers R. The ij ’s have the
property that i2j = −1. As before addition and multiplication are performed
polynomially, subject to certain relations. In particular, various triples of
the seven ij ’s (along with the real number 1) can be used to form seven
canonical copies of the quaternions H embedded within the octonions O as
various triple products of the i1 . . . i7 are also equal to −1. A mnemonic for
which of these triple products are in fact equal to −1 is given by an edge
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Figure 5: An edge oriented Fano plane.
oriented Fano plane illustrated in Figure 5.
This Fano plane indicates how certain octonionic triple products work.
In particular, when the ij , ik, il are cyclically ordered as in the lines of the
edge oriented Fano plane of Figure 4, then i2j = i
2
k = i
2
l = ijikil = −1. This
shows that in general ijik = il = −ikij .
Each octonion o as above possesses a octonionic conjugate o∗ given by
the formula
a0 −
7∑
j=1
ajij (2)
The real valued multiplicative norm (or length) on the octonions is defined
by the formula |o|2 = o∗o and all non-zero octonions o posess a non-zero
inverse o−1 = o
∗
|o| . As before the unit octonions are those with length 1.
From the octonionic representatives p, q, r of the players strategic choices,
Ahmed, Bleiler, and Khan [1] then give an algebraic octonionic expression
from which the probability distribution over the outcomes of G arising from
the profile of (p, q, r) can be computed directly from the particular unit
octonions arising from their expression by again just squaring the real length
of each of its eight canonical components. As in the two player case, this
octonionization of the payoff probabilities is used to examine the existence
of Nash equilibria in the quantized versions GQI and GmQI of the model.
It follows for zero sum games such as the Nash-Shapley Poker model, that
again there are no Nash equilibria among the pure quantum strategies, (i.e.
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in GQI ) and that there exists a Nash equilibrium in GmQI in which each
player uses the uniform probability distribution (or a discrete equivalent)
over his or her choice of pure quantum strategies. It is also worth noting
that again the equilibrium strategies given by the uniform distribution over
the pure quantum strategies are more than just best replies to each profile
of opponents strategies, they are in fact security strategies against which
players’ opponents have no recourse.
For each player, in equilibrium the resulting probability distribution over
the payoffs is again the uniform distribution, assigning an equal probability
to each of the eight outcomes of the Nash-Shapley model, and thus returning
as payoffs to the players the average of the original eight payoffs. So in
equilibrium players 1 and 2 can each expect to win 87.5 cents and player
3 can expect to lose $1.75. This is an enormous change from the classical
equilibrium payouts of an approximate 40 cent loss to players 1 and 2 and
approximate 80 cent win for player 3. The winners and losers of the game
have been interchanged by quantization, completely destroying player 3’s
positional advantage, and players 1 and 2 can expect to win even more in the
quantized version of the Nash-Shapley Poker model than player 3 expected
to win in the classical version. Once again we see the early position players
doing far better playing entangled poker over the quantum internet than by
playing standard poker in either the current on-line environment or in ”real
life”.
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